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Abstract 
In many political systems legislators face a fundamental trade-off between allocating effort to 
constituency service and to national policy-making activities, respectively. How do voters 
want their elected representatives to solve this trade-off? We provide new insights into this 
question by developing a conjoint analysis approach to estimating voters’ preferences over 
their legislator’s effort allocation. We apply our approach in Britain and find that effort 
allocation has a significant effect on voter evaluations of legislators, even in a political system 
where other legislator attributes – in particular party affiliation – might be expected to 
predominate. This effect is non-linear, with voters generally preferring a moderate balance of 
constituency and national policy work. Preferences over legislator effort allocation are not 
well-explained by self-interest or more broadly by instrumental considerations. They are, 
however, associated with voters’ local-cosmopolitan orientation, suggesting that heuristic 
reasoning based on underlying social dispositions may be more important in determining 
preferences over representative activities. 
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A fundamental decision that legislators in many political systems must make is how to 
allocate their limited resources between national policy work and constituency service. In his 
landmark study of US legislator ‘home styles’ Fenno (1978: 33) observed an ‘omnipresent 
and severe’ tension between these two broad types of activity, the first centered around the 
national legislature and involving committee membership, plenary debates and casting votes 
on legislation, the second centered on the legislator’s district, helping individual constituents 
with problems (‘case work’) or promoting the interests of larger groups of constituents 
(‘project work’). Since Fenno’s study, political scientists have developed a good 
understanding of how parliamentary representatives in various democracies divide their 
attention and effort between national policy work and constituency service (e.g. André et al. 
2015; Brouard et al. 2013; Butler et al. 2012; Cain et al. 1987; Heitshusen et al. 2005; Norton 
& Wood 1993).  
 Yet we know much less about how voters view the trade-off between their 
representative’s national policy work and constituency service. Existing survey research 
shows how voters rank legislators’ constituency and national policy-oriented activities in 
terms of importance (e.g. Cain et al. 1987: chapter 1; Cowley 2013; Grant & Rudolph 2004; 
Griffin & Flavin 2011; Méndez-Lago & Martínez 2002), but does not tell us about the 
balance of constituency service and national policy work that voters want. Moreover, it 
remains unclear whether voters really care about representatives’ effort allocation when 
compared to other legislator attributes – for example, party affiliation – or whether voters care 
about effort allocation only inasmuch as it serves as a proxy for other legislator attributes.  
 Advancing our understanding of these voter preferences is important because it allows 
us to better evaluate whether legislators’ effort allocation decisions correspond to the wishes 
of their constituents (Grant & Rudolph 2004; Griffin & Flavin 2011). A lack of such 
correspondence could lead to voter dissatisfaction not just with individual representatives, but 
also with the political system more broadly (Bowler & Karp 2004). 
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 In this paper, we contribute by developing and implementing a new approach to the 
estimation of popular preferences over the trade-off between constituency service and national 
policy work. We present the results of two conjoint analysis survey experiments (Green et al. 
2001; Hainmueller et al. 2014) in which representative samples of British voters were asked 
to choose between pairs of hypothetical local Members of Parliament (MPs) who varied on 
several attributes, including their allocation of effort to constituency service and national 
policy work. Our empirical strategy has important advantages. Compared to an observational 
study of MP constituency effort and subsequent electoral performance, an experimental 
approach dramatically reduces concerns about endogeneity and measurement error. Compared 
to existing survey-based approaches, a conjoint analysis approach yields valuable additional 
information regarding: the mix of constituency and national policy work that constituents 
prefer (not just their rank ordering of different activities); the extent to which constituents care 
about this trade-off when it is just one of various politically salient MP attributes; and whether 
preferences over constituency service versus national policy are conditional on other MP 
attributes.  
 We find that British voters do care about how their legislative representatives allocate 
effort between national policy work and constituency service. Even though our hypothetical 
MPs varied on several other potentially important attributes, voters’ choices between MPs 
were significantly influenced by the time those MPs allocated to constituency and national 
policy work, respectively. Crucially, even in a party-dominated system such as Britain, 
partisan considerations did not overwhelm concerns about individual MP effort allocation, 
suggesting that this attribute is also likely to matter for voter evaluations in less party-
dominated systems such as the United States. Moreover, our conjoint analysis results suggest 
that the importance voters attach to effort allocation does not result simply from the 
possibility that voters use a high level of constituency effort as a proxy for faithful 
representation of constituency policy preferences or independence from partisan politics. 
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 Interestingly, we find that the effect of increasing constituency attentiveness is non-
linear. Voters have a clear aversion to MPs who spend the minimum possible amount of time 
on constituency service, but prefer MPs who strike a moderate balance between constituency 
service and national policy work to MPs who spend the maximum possible amount of time on 
constituency service. This finding is difficult to reconcile with the notion that preferences 
over legislator home-styles result from instrumental reasoning. Instead, we present initial 
evidence that demand for constituency service is associated with heuristic reasoning based on 
local-cosmopolitan orientation – i.e. the extent to which they care about their local community 
or about broader groups such as the nation as a whole (Bechtel et al. 2014; Dye 1963).  
 
EXPECTATIONS 
Should we expect voters to care about how their legislator allocates attention between 
constituency service and national policy work? Given that this decision fundamentally shapes 
a legislator’s representational style (Fenno, 1978), it would make sense for voters to be 
concerned about it. Evidence from the UK and US suggests that legislators believe that their 
constituents care about how much effort they allocate to constituency service and that this 
allocative decision is consequential for their re-election prospects (Cain et al. 1987: 80-84), a 
belief likely to be rooted in legislators’ own interactions with their constituents. This is also 
consistent with existing survey evidence that, when offered a list of activities undertaken by 
legislators, voters often rank constituency-oriented activities as important (Cain et al. 1987, 
ch. 1; Cowley 2013; Grant and Rudolph 2004; Griffin & Flavin 2011; Méndez-Lago & 
Martínez 2002).  
 However, the political world involves multidimensional judgments and choices, and 
voters may not place much weight on how their legislator divides his or her time when they 
simultaneously consider other attributes of that MP. In particular, voters may focus more on 
MP party affiliation rather than MP effort allocation. In a party-centric Westminster system 
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such as the British one, many voters may only care about whether their MP occupies a seat in 
parliament for their preferred national party and therefore increases the chances of that party 
influencing policy or forming a government. Moreover, voters may sensibly use party 
affiliation as an information short-cut rather than having to collect and process other 
information about MPs (Ferejohn 1990). Beyond party affiliation, voters may also distinguish 
between representatives based on their dissent from their party line on policy (Carson et al. 
2010; Kam 2009), their role interpretation as a trustee or delegate (Barker & Carman 2012; 
Bengtsson and Wass 2010; Carman 2006, 2007; Doherty 2013), their legislative experience 
(Jacobson 1989), and their gender (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Given that such other attributes are 
important to voters, they may not care about effort allocation when they also have information 
about these other characteristics of legislators.  
 A further issue is whether voters care about MP effort allocation itself or just perceive 
this as a signal – or ‘alias’ (Hainmueller et al. 2014) – of some other attribute. One potentially 
‘aliased’ attribute is an MP’s trustee/delegate style of representation: voters may assume that 
an MP who devotes more time to constituency service will also more ardently represent 
constituents’ views in national policy debates. Another potentially ‘aliased’ attribute is MP 
independence from party: voters may assume that MPs who focus attention on Westminster 
are also party loyalists. Trustees and rebels are generally preferred by voters (e.g. Carson et al. 
2010; Carman 2006), so we must distinguish preferences over MP constituency effort 
allocation from preferences over these other attributes.  
 The key question is therefore whether voters care about MP effort allocation when 
asked to consider other MP characteristics that are more relevant to citizens and/or aliased by 
effort allocation. As we detail below, our conjoint analysis approach allows us to answer this 
question in a way that observational and existing survey-based studies cannot. First, however, 
we consider alternative potential explanations for preferences over MP effort allocation, based 
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on different styles of voter reasoning: self-interested and instrumental reasoning on the one 
hand, and heuristic reasoning based on social dispositions on the other. 
 
Self-interested and instrumental reasoning 
Existing explanations for voter preferences over legislator effort allocation have tended to 
focus on self-interested and instrumental reasoning on the part of voters (Griffin and Flavin, 
2011; Harden, 2011). According to this type of explanation, voters ask themselves how the 
work of a representative could produce personal benefits for themselves (Harden 2011; Sears 
& Funk 1991). These personal benefits may be tangible and direct: for example, a 
representative can help constituents in their dealings with other branches of government 
(‘service responsiveness’) (Eulau & Karps 1977). They can also accrue if a representative 
supports the local constituency as a whole, for example if they address the needs and 
problems of local groups (‘project work’) (Norton & Wood 1993) or secure funds and goods 
for the constituency (‘allocation responsiveness’) (Eulau & Karps 1977). Finally, personal 
benefits may of course also result from the national policy work of a representative, who can 
help to develop laws or amendments that further the well-being of the constituent. For 
example, a representative could be influential in ensuring that regulation is advantageous to a 
citizen’s business. The self-interest of citizens can therefore conceivably be furthered by both 
local constituency and national policy work. 
 Which type of work self-interested citizens prefer should depend on how their 
representative can achieve a greater impact, which is in turn largely determined by the 
institutional setting within which representatives are situated. Therefore, the more a political 
system limits an individual representative’s impact on national policy, the more 
instrumentally motivated constituents should prioritize their representative’s constituency 
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work over his or her national policy work.
1
 Given that British MPs have a comparatively low 
level of influence on national policy outcomes (Cain et al. 1987; Lijphart 2012) but can be 
reasonably effective at carrying out constituency service (Cain et al. 1987: 60; Norton & 
Wood 1993)
2
, the self-interest account would predict that, on average, British citizens should 
strongly prioritize constituency work over national policy work. The self-interest account also 
predicts how preferences should vary between citizens within the same political system. In 
particular, citizens should have a greater preference for effort allocated to constituency work 
the more they themselves stand to benefit from this (Griffin & Flavin 2011; Harden 2011).   
 A related explanation for preferences over legislator effort allocation is that citizens 
are instrumental but driven by sociotropic concerns as well as self-interest (Kinder & Kiewiet 
1979; Funk 2000; Sears & Funk 1991). Here, citizens are not exclusively concerned with their 
expected personal gains from the work of a representative, but also attach some weight to the 
total expected benefit to society – i.e. how many people in society are likely to benefit from 
the work of the representative and by how much (Edlin et al. 2007). Interestingly, if voters are 
sociotropic rather than purely self-interested, national policy work should retain some value 
even if there is only a low probability that an individual MP will influence national outcomes:
 
any improvement in national public policy will impact millions of people across the entire 
country (Edlin et al. 2007), which raises the expected gains from national policy work relative 
                                                          
1
 We expect the same result if one increases the impact of constituency work on local 
outcomes. 
2
 This is partly because UK constituencies are of a manageable size, averaging 68,000 voters 
(See http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/constituencies/, accessed 14 
May 2013).  
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to those from constituency work.
3
 However, we do not know the weight that voters attach to 
societal benefit relative to individual benefit, so the sociotropic account does not generate 
clear predictions regarding average preferences over MP effort allocation across British 
voters.  
 Nevertheless, because both the sociotropic and the self-interest accounts share the 
assumption that voters are instrumental and goal-oriented, we can conduct a joint test for both 
explanations based on variation in preferences across voters. If voters reason instrumentally, 
their preferences over the trade-off between MP constituency work and national policy work 
should depend on the expected impact of each activity. Specifically, we should observe that 
voters prefer more MP effort to be devoted to constituency service the more impact they 
perceive MPs to have on constituency outcomes compared to national policy outcomes.
4
 
                                                          
3
 Of course, there is a degree of societal gain from constituency service activities (e.g., saving 
a hospital or factory from closure benefits a number of people), but compared to national 
policy changes these activities can only benefit a limited number of people in the immediate 
locality. 
4
 This prediction holds if one extends the sociotropic voting account to allow voters to attach 
extra weight to the welfare of certain societal groups (e.g. social classes, ethnic groups, or 
geographic groups) (Mutz & Mondak 1997). To see this, take an extreme case, where the 
voter attaches weight exclusively to the welfare of a certain social group, and therefore 
evaluates MP effort allocation solely in terms of outcomes for this group. As long as this 
group can potentially benefit from both constituency work and national policy work on the 
part of the voter’s own MP, then the voter’s preferences over MP effort allocation should be 
sensitive to the perceived relative effectiveness of the two types of MP activity. If the social 
group in question has members in the voter’s own constituency and in other constituencies (as 
would likely be the case with a particular social class), then the group as a whole may benefit 
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Heuristic reasoning based on social dispositions 
An alternative explanation holds that constituent preferences over MP activities are not driven 
by instrumental reasoning but by the use of basic underlying dispositions or orientations as 
heuristics.
5
 In this paper, we test one disposition that voters would plausibly use as a heuristic 
to evaluate how MPs should divide attention between constituency and national policy work: 
the degree to which voters themselves have a local or national/cosmopolitan outlook (Dye 
1963; Jennings 1967; Merton 1957). This ‘local-cosmopolitanism’ captures the extent to 
which individuals care about and pay attention to developments in their local area over and 
above national and international developments (Jennings 1967: 293).
6
 It reflects an 
individual’s degree of attachment, sense of belonging and general affect towards his or her 
local area (Roudometof 2005; Olofsson & Öhman 2007) and is related to voting behaviour in 
US presidential elections (Jackman & Vavreck 2011) as well as attitudes towards Eurozone 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
from national policy changes effected by the voter’s MP, while at least a subset of the group 
may benefit from the MP’s constituency work. Even if the social group in question has 
members exclusively in the voter’s own constituency (e.g., if the group is the voter’s own 
local community), this group obviously benefits from their MP’s constituency work, but can 
still benefit from national policy work for the same reasons that an individual constituent can 
potentially benefit from their MP’s national policy work (see above). 
5
 In terms of dual-process models (Chaiken & Trope 1999), instrumental reasoning stems 
from careful System 2 thinking, whereas heuristic reasoning is more intuitive and thus related 
to System 1. 
6
 While in the literature the disposition ranges from a local via a national to a global 
cosmopolitan outlook, we focus in this paper on the contrast between local and national 
orientations. 
10 
 
bailouts (Bechtel et al. 2014). Potential antecedents of local-cosmopolitan disposition include 
factors such as personality traits, education and social class (Jennings 1967, Jackman & 
Vavreck 2011).
7
  
 If constituents use this disposition as a heuristic when considering MP effort 
allocation, they simply evaluate whether the focus of the MP’s activity reflects their own 
local-cosmopolitan orientation, rather than evaluating the expected outcome of the MP’s 
activity. Thus, citizens with a more local orientation would prefer constituency work because 
they see their local area as the more relevant level of the polity, while voters with a more 
cosmopolitan orientation would want their representative to focus on parliamentary activities 
because they primarily think of politics in terms of national or international issues. Contrast 
this with the instrumental reasoning hypothesis, which posits that even if a voter has a 
cosmopolitan outlook (and therefore ultimately cares more about national politics), this voter 
will nevertheless prefer their representative to focus on constituency work if this is where they 
think the MP can have the greatest impact. 
 Based on this logic we can formulate the individual-level hypothesis that if voters use 
their local-cosmopolitan orientation as a heuristic when reasoning about legislator effort 
allocation then voters with a less local orientation will have a greater preference for national 
policy work. Moreover, if voters make use of this heuristic rather than reasoning 
instrumentally, then preferences over effort allocation should be unrelated to the perceived 
impact of legislators on constituency versus national policy outcomes. 
 At the national level, this would suggest that the average voter preference concerning 
representative effort allocation should at least partly result from how locally or nationally 
                                                          
7
 This also means it is possible that voter characteristics such as economic disadvantage may 
indirectly affect preferences over MP effort allocation by shaping local-cosmopolitan 
orientation. 
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oriented voters are on average. It is likely that British voters are rather nationally oriented 
compared to voters elsewhere.  In Britain, national politics generally dominates regional and 
local politics: units of local or regional government have little significant political power 
(Marks et al. 2008), and the newspaper market is characterized by influential national 
newspapers (Bens & Ostbye 1998). To the extent that these factors shape local-cosmopolitan 
orientations in a population, we would therefore expect that British voters on average prefer 
at least a moderate amount of national policy work from their legislator. 
 
METHOD 
We estimate voters’ preferences over the effort allocated by representatives to constituency 
and national policy work using choice-based conjoint analysis survey experiments (Green et 
al. 2001; Hainmueller et al. 2014). Such experiments typically involve participants making 
choices between two or more alternatives that vary along several dimensions and have 
recently been employed by political scientists to evaluate voter preferences over candidate 
attributes (Franchino and Zucchini 2015; Hainmueller et al. 2014). In our experiment, we ask 
respondents to choose between two MPs characterized by several varying attributes. 
 The conjoint analysis approach combines the advantages of existing survey-based 
strategies for eliciting voter preferences over representative characteristics and behavior. 
Traditional split sample survey experiments – where respondents evaluate legislators who 
vary along one or two dimensions (e.g. Huddy & Terkildsen 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002; 
Campbell & Cowley 2014) – provide detailed information concerning voters’ preferences 
over a particular legislator attribute of interest, as do non-experimental studies which ask 
respondents more directly how they think a representative should act on a specific behavioural 
dimension (e.g. Carman 2006). Meanwhile, studies which ask survey respondents to rank 
various legislator activities (e.g. Cain et al. 1987) yield information about the relative 
importance voters attach to these different activities. By presenting voters with 
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multidimensional choices, a conjoint analysis approach yields both types of information 
simultaneously. This enables us to test explanations for voter preferences over the MP effort 
allocation trade-off at the same time as examining whether voters in fact care about this trade-
off. It also enables us to test whether voters simply view MP effort allocation as a proxy for 
other MP attributes by testing whether effort allocation has an impact in the presence of 
explicit information about these other attributes. 
 Another alternative empirical strategy used in the literature relies on behavioral rather 
than survey data, examining how legislators’ effort allocation affects their subsequent 
electoral performance (Cain et al. 1987; Gaines 1998; Norton & Wood 1993). Of course, such 
an observational strategy overcomes the external validity issues associated with any survey 
experiment. However, drawing clear inferences from observational studies is problematic if 
representative behavior is endogenously influenced by constituent expectations or by local 
electoral vulnerability (Cain et al. 1987: 128; King 1991). Furthermore, observational studies 
may understate how much constituents care about representative effort allocation if 
constituents do not receive clear information about effort allocation decisions or if their 
perceptions are subject to partisan biases. In contrast, in our survey experiments the variation 
in representative behavior is clearly measured and exogenous by design, and all subjects 
receive unambiguous information concerning this behavior. Furthermore, as Hainmueller et 
al. (2014: 27) point out, a conjoint analysis design arguably improves external validity relative 
to other types of survey experiments: presenting respondents with rounded, multidimensional 
legislator profiles not only encourages more realistic respondent choices, but also gives fewer 
incentives for respondents to offer socially desirable answers (since there are multiple 
justifications for any given choice). 
 
Experimental design 
We ran two conjoint analysis survey experiments. The first was fielded between 5 and 6 
13 
 
December 2012 to 1,899 respondents. The second was fielded between 24 and 25 September 
2013 to 1,919 respondents. For each survey, YouGov drew a sample from its online panel, 
designed to be representative of British adults.
8
 
 After a short introduction, we asked respondents to consider pairs of hypothetical MPs 
characterized by five attributes, each of which had between 2 and 4 levels. Our focus in this 
paper is on the effort allocated to constituency service and national policy work. As a 
                                                          
8
 YouGov maintain an online panel of over 360,000 British adults (recruited via their own 
website, advertising, and partnerships with other websites), with data on the socio-
demographic characteristics and newspaper readership of each panel member. Drawing on 
this information, YouGov uses targeted quota sampling to select a sub-sample of panelists for 
participation in each survey, with quotas based on the distribution of age, gender, social class 
and type of newspaper readership in the British adult population. YouGov has multiple 
surveys running at any time and uses proprietary software to determine, on a rolling basis, 
which panelists to email invites to and how to allocate invitees to surveys when they respond. 
Panelists who are ‘slow’ to respond to invites are thus still able to participate in surveys. 
Along with the modest cash incentives YouGov offer to survey participants, this helps ensure 
that survey samples contain panelists who are less politically engaged. A recent British 
Election Study comparison of YouGov data with a more traditional face-to-face survey 
showed only small differences in the distribution of most key explanatory variables and in 
regression models for political choices (Sanders et al. 2007). For further information on 
YouGov’s sampling procedures see https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology/ and 
http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/custom/uploads/2014/05/BES_Wave1_tech.pdf. All 
analyses reported here use un-weighted data. Appendix 8 in the supplemental information 
illustrates how our main results are unchanged when we weight the data according to standard 
YouGov weights (constructed using the same targets used for the sampling quotas).  
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behavioral manifestation of effort allocation, we state how the MPs divided their working 
week between these two activities. Specifically, each MP could spend 1/2/3/4 days ‘working 
on local constituency issues’ and 4/3/2/1 days ‘reviewing and working on national policies in 
Parliament’, with each MP being constrained to work for five days in total. We took care to 
phrase the activities in a neutral and non-technical way: we do not state whether the MP 
actually has any influence on parliamentary or constituency outcomes, nor the extent to which 
the MP has important posts within the parliament. Overall, this formulation makes the trade-
off between the two types of activity explicit while avoiding presenting either in an obviously 
positive light. It also, captures how constituency work is usually thought about in Britain, 
namely as case and project work for local voters. Other aspects of constituency service, such 
as the ability to deliver pork and shape national legislation in locally beneficial ways, are less 
relevant in the UK than in, for instance, the United States (Cain et al. 1987: 39).  
 A key decision in designing conjoint analyses concerns which additional attributes to 
include in the vignettes. First, we included the two MP attributes we identified as being 
potentially ‘aliased’ by MP effort allocation (Hainmueller et al. 2014). Thus, in Study 2 we 
included a trustee-delegate attribute, explicitly stating whether each MP pays more attention 
to his or her own personal views or to those of his or her constituents when thinking about 
national policy. To capture MP independence from party, in both studies we also varied the 
dissent behavior of MPs. In Study 1, we varied the frequency with which the MP speaks out 
or votes against his/her party leadership. In Study 2, we varied how MPs act when they 
disagree with the party leadership: they could either speak out internally only, or speak out 
internally and externally, or fail to speak out at all.  
Second, we included other MP attributes that capture key factors thought to influence 
evaluations of representatives. Crucially, we varied the party affiliation of the MP between 
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Labour and Conservative.
9
 In addition, we varied whether the MP was male or female, and (in 
Study 1) whether the MP had been in parliament for 3, 10 or 21 years (roughly corresponding 
to the elections in 2010, 2000 and 1992).
10
  
 MP attribute values were assigned randomly and independently. For our outcome 
variable we asked respondents: Based on this information, which ONE of these two MPs 
would you prefer to have as your MP in the House of Commons?
11
 Respondents were 
presented with a total of five choice tasks.  
 Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the pre-experiment introductory text as well as a 
randomly generated example choice task from Study 1. Descriptions were presented in 
paragraph format to make them more readable; in cognitive pre-testing, a tabular format 
proved more burdensome for respondents. While attribute ordering is not randomized, we 
varied the placement of the days spent on constituency versus parliamentary work: in Study 1 
they were the first two bullet points, and in Study 2 the final two bullet points.  
 
Modeling the data 
Each study yields ten observations per respondent, one for each hypothetical MP with which 
they are presented across their five choice tasks (e.g. we have 1,899 x 2 x 5 = 18,990 
observations for Study 1). Our outcome variable measures whether or not the respondent 
                                                          
9
 We did not include MPs from other political parties for reasons of simplicity. 
10
 Appendix 1 contains the full list of MP attributes and their possible values. 
11
 A response was required; there was no ‘don’t know’ option. In Study 2, we left out the 
phrase ‘in the House of Commons’ to avoid priming national policy considerations. We also 
included a second question in Study 1, asking respondents to assess how happy they would be 
to have each MP represent them in Parliament. Analyses using this question yield 
substantively similar results. 
16 
 
chose that MP. More formally, if 𝑖 =  {1, … , 1899}, 𝑘 =  {1, … , 5}, 𝑗 =  {1, 2} and 𝑙 =
 {1, … , 5} index subjects, choice tasks, choice alternatives (i.e. MPs) and choice attributes, 
respectively, our binary dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 is equal to one if subject i in the kth choice 
task chooses the jth MP, and zero otherwise.  
 Our causal quantity of interest is the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of 
each level of an MP attribute: that is, the change in the probability that an MP is preferred by 
the average British voter when the value of the attribute (component) of interest is changed 
from one level to another, averaging over all possible values of the MP’s remaining attributes 
and all possible values of the attributes of the other MP in the choice task (Hainmueller et al. 
2014). Because our design employs completely independent randomization, simple 
difference-in-means analysis yields unbiased AMCE estimates (Hainmueller et al. 2014: 16). 
We estimate these differences via OLS with dummy variables for each level of the attribute of 
interest. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. 
 
RESULTS 
Based on our experiments, we first examine the average effect of MP effort allocation on 
British voters before examining how this effect varies across individuals. In the supporting 
materials, we also discuss the estimated effects of the other MP attributes included in the 
experiments and test the validity of the assumptions underlying our AMCE estimates 
(Appendices 3 and 4). 
 
Average preferences over MP time allocation 
Figure 2 presents population AMCE estimates for the number of days per week an MP spends 
on constituency service as opposed to national policy work. For each level of the attribute, the 
dot indicates the point estimate for the effect of that level relative to the baseline level where 
an MP spends 1 day per week on constituency service. The bars represent 95% confidence 
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intervals.  
 Figure 2 strongly suggests that British voters do care about how their MP allocates 
effort between constituency service and national policy work, even when simultaneously 
confronted with information about other MP attributes, including those potentially aliased by 
effort allocation. There is a clear aversion among voters toward having an MP who allocates 
the minimal amount of time to constituency work: compared to an MP who spends only one 
day per week on constituency issues, MPs who spend two, three or four days per week 
working on constituency issues are all more likely to be preferred by voters. These estimated 
effects are all statistically significant and, at between 7 and 13 percentage points, substantial 
in magnitude too. They also are not an artefact of respondents failing to discriminate between 
different MP attributes in terms of their importance: while some of the other attributes 
included in the experiments (e.g. MP independent-mindedness and trustee/delegate style of 
representation) had stronger effects on respondent choices than did MP time allocation, others 
(e.g. gender and parliamentary experience) barely influenced respondents’ choices at all (see 
Appendix 3).  
 The results in Figure 2 average over two types of choice task: same-party 
comparisons, where both MPs have the same party affiliation, and different-party 
comparisons, where one MP is Conservative and the other Labour. Unsurprisingly, additional 
analysis shows that the effects of MP effort allocation are weaker when voters are presented 
with different- rather than same-party comparisons (see Appendix 5). However, even in 
different-party comparisons the effects of an MP spending two, three and four days on 
constituency work are all statistically significant and have point estimates ranging from 5.9 to 
8.3 percentage points.
12
 Thus, MP’s effort allocation matters to voters, even when they 
                                                          
12
 We also checked all two-way interactions between MP time allocation and each other MP 
attribute. All joint F-tests of all interaction terms were non-significant at the 0.05 level. 
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simultaneously have to choose between parties. 
 Figure 2 also tells us about the mix of constituency service and national policy work 
that British voters prefer their MP to engage in. Our key finding with regard to this is that the 
effect of MP days spent on constituency service appears to be non-linear. For example, in 
Study 1, an increase in MP time spent on constituency work from the baseline level of one 
day per week to two days per week leads to a 10.7 percent increase in the probability that an 
MP is preferred (95% confidence interval = [8.6, 12.7]). However, an increase from the 
baseline level to three days only leads to a slightly larger increase of 12.8 [10.7, 14.9] percent. 
Furthermore, at 7.7 [5.4, 9.9] percent, the effect of an increase in constituency work from the 
baseline to the maximum of four days per week is actually significantly smaller than that of 
an increase from the baseline to three days per week.
13
 In other words, voters prefer to have 
an MP who strikes a balance of around three days constituency work to two days national 
policy work. This pattern is at odds with the notion that citizens’ preferences over MP 
activities are driven mainly by self-interest, for according to that logic British voters should 
generally prefer MPs to concentrate on constituency work.  
 To further assess the self-interest explanation for preferences over MP effort 
allocation, as well as other potential explanations, we now turn to examining how preferences 
vary across voters.  
 
Likelihood of personally benefitting from constituency work 
If citizens are self-interested, then those voters who stand to personally benefit more from 
                                                          
13
 The pattern for Study 2 is very similar, suggesting that these results are not simply an 
artifact of timing or design: these studies were fielded a number of months apart and varied in 
terms attribute ordering and wording. 
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constituency service should prefer their MP to spend more time on this activity. We test this 
prediction in two ways.  
 First, we examine whether constituents who are predisposed to seek assistance from an 
MP also want their MP to allocate more time to their constituency. We compare respondents 
based on whether or not they, or someone they know well, had sought personal assistance 
from their local MP in the last 3 or 4 years. Yet, there are no clearly discernible differences 
between these groups in the effects of MP constituency work: the maximum difference in 
AMCE point estimates across the two groups is only 3 per cent (for the AMCE of four MP 
days on constituency work), the confidence intervals for the estimated effects tend to overlap 
with each other, and an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between MP 
constituency work and voter propensity to seek MP assistance (p = 0.44, see Appendix 6 in 
the supplemental information for full results).         
 Second, we also examined whether more socio-economically disadvantaged citizens 
prefer a greater focus on constituency work, as such voters are more likely to benefit from the 
support and advice of MPs. Yet, when we compare respondents based on their social grade, 
there is at best a very weak tendency for respondents with lower social grades to prefer 
greater MP attention to constituency work: the maximum difference in estimated effects 
comparing respondents in the two most extreme social grade groups (AB versus DE) is only 
four percent, and an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the effect of MP days on 
constituency work is the same across voter social grades (p = 0.58; see Appendix 6 in the 
supplemental information for full results).
14
 Results are substantively similar when using 
respondent income as an alternative measure of economic disadvantage. 
 Of course, these voter characteristics are variables over which we have no 
                                                          
14
 Measures for social grade provided by YouGov and based on the occupation of the 
household’s chief income earner. 
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experimental control, so we cannot draw strong causal inferences from such analyses. 
Nevertheless, it does seem that voters who can expect greater personal gain from a 
constituency-oriented MP do not tend to prefer greater amounts of constituency work. We 
take this as further evidence that voters’ preferences over the MP time allocation trade-off are 
unlikely to be driven by narrow self-interest. 
 
Perceived impact of MP activities 
If voters reason instrumentally – motivated by either self-interest or sociotropic concerns – 
then those who think MPs have a greater national impact should prefer their MP to focus 
more on policy work in Parliament, while those who believe MPs have a greater impact at the 
local level should prioritize constituency work. To test this, in Study 2 we measured 
respondent perceptions of MPs’ relative local and national influence using two agree-disagree 
statements:  
1. A typical MP makes more of a difference on local issues than on national policy. 
2. Individual MPs can have an important influence on national policy in Parliament.  
We then group voters according to their levels of agreement with each of these statements and 
estimated the effect of MP time allocation separately for each group. The results are presented 
in Figure 3, and suggest no clear relationship between preferences over MP effort allocation 
and perceptions of the relative impact of MP activities, whether the latter is measured by the 
first or second statement above. The corresponding F-tests are non-significant in both cases (p 
= 0.40 and p = 0.54, respectively), and the maximum difference in point estimates across 
subgroups is only 4.5 percent (the difference in the effect of three MP days on constituency 
work comparing respondents who agree and disagree with the first statement above). Thus, 
there is little indication in our data that instrumental reasoning provides an adequate account 
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of British voters’ preferences over MP effort allocation.15  
 
 
Local-cosmopolitan orientation  
The heuristic reasoning explanation predicts that voter preferences over MP effort allocation 
should be related to voters underlying local-cosmopolitan orientation. To measure the latter, 
we asked respondents in Study 2 to rate their agreement with two statements that assess 
whether they care more about and pay more attention to local or national politics (see Dye 
1963, Jennings 1967, and Bechtel et al. 2014, for a similar approach):  
1. I care more about how things are in my local area than about how things are in the 
UK as a whole. 
2. I pay more attention to national UK politics than to politics in my local area.  
Notice that we measure two different aspects of local-cosmopolitan orientation – namely, 
perceived relevance and attention – and vary the polarity of the agree-disagree statements to 
mitigate acquiescence bias.  
 Figure 4 compares the estimated effects of MP effort allocation in our experiment 
when we subset respondents according to their local-cosmopolitan orientation. For either 
measure of respondent local-cosmopolitan orientation, there is a clear interaction with MP 
effort allocation, with significant F-tests in both cases (p-value < 0.01 and p-value = 0.03 for 
statements 3 and 4, respectively). 
                                                          
15
 If voters are instrumental and self-interested, it may be that perceptions of the relative 
efficacy of MP constituency work and national policy work condition the relationship 
between how much a voter stands to benefit personally from constituency service and how 
much effort a voter prefers their MP to allocate to constituency service. However, when we 
use social grade to proxy likely personal benefits from constituency service, we find little 
evidence of such an interaction. See Appendix 6 of the supplemental information.  
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 Furthermore, the nature of the interaction is as expected under the heuristic reasoning 
hypothesis. In the first panel of Figure 4, the more a constituent cares about their local area 
relative to the UK as a whole, the greater the positive effect of an MP spending more days per 
week on constituency service; those who care most about their local area relative to the UK as 
a whole actually prefer MPs to allocate the maximum four days per week to constituency 
service, while those who care least about their local area prefer this type of MP least. In the 
second panel, as constituents pay more attention to national rather than local politics, the 
effect of an MP spending more time on constituency service become significantly smaller. 
These results are consistent with the argument that popular preferences over MP effort 
allocation are driven less by detailed instrumental calculations, and more by basic orientations 
toward the object of MP activities.  
 Of course, voters’ local-cosmopolitan orientations do not emerge out of a vacuum. 
Indeed, consistent with previous research (Jackman & Vavreck 2011) we find that 
respondents with a higher level of education, social grade and income tend to have a more 
cosmopolitan orientation. However, we show in the supporting materials that these 
background characteristics are not directly associated with preferences over MP effort 
allocation (Appendix 6), and that the interaction between MP effort allocation and respondent 
local-cosmopolitanism is robust when we control for these background characteristics and 
their interaction with MP effort allocation (Appendix 7). Thus, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the observed association between local-cosmopolitan orientation and preferences 
over MP effort allocation is a spurious one driven by the antecedents of local-
cosmopolitanism. 
 Finally, our local-cosmopolitan items were asked after the experiment to avoid 
priming considerations among respondents. One additional concern could therefore be that 
post-hoc rationalization may be responsible for the observed interaction. However, the 
incentive for rationalization should be comparatively low in a conjoint analysis as no single 
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attribute is highlighted to respondents. Moreover, if respondents were rationalizing post-hoc, 
we should also have observed an association between perceived MP local-national influence 
(also measured after the experiment) and effort allocation preferences.  
  
CONCLUSION 
The results of our conjoint analysis experiments show that British voters prefer to have a 
legislative representative who devotes at least a moderate amount of time to national policy 
work while still paying strong attention to their constituency. Crucially, this preference is 
manifest in voters’ choices between MPs even in the presence of a variety of politically 
relevant MP attributes that could plausibly overwhelm these concerns (particularly MP party 
affiliation) or that might otherwise be aliased by MP effort allocation (MP trustee/delegate 
representational style and independence from party). We also find that instrumental concerns 
do not provide a powerful explanation for these preferences. Most surprisingly, there is little 
evidence of an association between voters’ preferences over effort allocation and their beliefs 
about where MP’s have an influence in the British political system. Instead, variation in 
preferences is more consistent with heuristic reasoning, whereby voters use more basic 
dispositions – here, their local-cosmopolitan orientation – as criteria for assessing effort 
allocation.  
 These results have implications for understanding cross-national patterns in 
constituent preferences over the effort allocation trade-off. In previous research, legislative 
institutions, and in particular the degree to which such institutions afford individual 
representatives influence over national policy, play a central and direct role as determinants of 
voter preferences (Cain et al. 1987). In contrast, our findings imply that cross-national 
variation in preferences over effort allocation may well be better explained by variation in the 
strength of local identities in different countries. Future research could test this possibility by 
deploying the conjoint analysis approach developed here in countries other than the UK. Such 
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comparative research would also allow us to test whether political institutions more broadly 
may have an indirect influence on voter effort allocation preferences by shaping identities and 
dispositions among voters.  
 What do our findings tell us about how representatives’ activities might influence 
electoral choices? On the one hand, our experiments show that the impact of MP effort 
allocation is weaker in more competitive partisan settings, which are more representative of a 
general election contest. Compounding this, voters in a real election will in all likelihood have 
less precise information about their MP’s activities than our experimental subjects. However, 
our experiments nevertheless offer unprecedentedly detailed information as to how MP effort 
allocation is likely to affect vote choices when it does so, and this type of information can 
inform future observational studies of the relationship between legislators’ effort allocation 
and their electoral support. In particular, since our experiments show that the key distinction 
voters are likely to make is between an MP who has an almost complete focus on national 
policy and one who does not, we would strongly suggest that such studies test for a non-linear 
relationship. 
 Finally, we argued earlier that one reason why establishing the nature of voter 
preferences is important is to examine whether there is a mismatch between citizen 
expectations and legislators’ actual effort allocation decisions, an important question for 
democratic representation (Grant & Rudolph 2004; Griffin & Flavin 2011). For the case of 
Britain, we can conclude that this mismatch is relatively minor. Despite fears that voters 
might make unrealistic demands for constituency service (Cain et al. 1987; Norton & Wood 
1993: 155; Wright 2010), they in fact tend to prefer MPs to engage in a moderate balance of 
constituency and national policy work at Westminster. Furthermore, research by Korris (2011: 
6) finds that MPs newly elected in 2010 allocate 63% of their time to constituency service and 
37% to national policy work; this is strikingly similar to the 60-40 split that was most 
preferred in our experiments. From this perspective, our findings are encouraging with regard 
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to the quality of the representative-constituent link in the UK. 
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Figure 1: Screen shots from conjoint experiment (Study 1) 
 
Note: The top panel shows the introductory screen that all respondents saw before starting the 
experiment. The lower panel shows a randomly generated example choice task. Each 
respondent completed five such tasks. 
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Figure 2: Effects of MP attributes on probability of being preferred by voter (Study 1 and 
Study 2) 
 
Note: MPs in both studies allocated between 1 and 4 days per week to constituency service 
and the remainder to national policy work. Points show the average marginal component 
effect relative to the baseline (1 day spent on constituency work). Bars show 95 per cent 
confidence intervals. For results on the other MP attributes included in the conjoint analysis, 
see the supporting information. 
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Figure 3: Effect of MP constituency focus by perception of MP impact (Study 2) 
 
Note: Each plot shows estimates for British voters grouped by their level of agreement with 
the statement above the plot. Respondents recorded their level of agreement with each 
statement on a five-point scale, and we re-coded these responses into three groups: ‘disagree’, 
‘neither’, and ‘agree’  
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Figure 4: Effect of MP constituency focus by local-cosmopolitan orientation (Study 2) 
 
Note: Each plot shows estimates for British voters grouped by their level of agreement with 
the statement above the plot. Respondents recorded their level of agreement with each 
statement on a five-point scale, and we re-coded these responses into three groups:  
‘disagree’, ‘neither’, and ‘agree’. 
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Appendix 1: Full text of conjoint analysis experiments 
 
Below is the full text of the two conjoint analysis survey experiments. The text in parentheses 
is the text that varied randomly across tasks. The text in bold also appeared in bold on screen. 
 
Study 1: 
MP (1/2) has been a (Labour/Conservative) MP for (3/10/21) years. 
 (He/She) spends on average (1 day/2 days/3 days/4 days) of a 5-day week reviewing 
and working on national policies in Parliament, and  
 The remaining (4 days/3 days/2 days/1 day) days working on local constituency 
issues. 
 (He/She) (never/rarely/sometimes/often) speaks out or votes against (his/her) party 
leadership. 
 
Study 2: 
MP 1 is a (Labour/Conservative) MP. 
 When considering national policy, (he/she) mainly thinks about (his/her) (own 
personal/constituents’) views. 
 If these views on policy differ from those of the party leadership (he/she) 
(nevertheless tends not to speak out/tends to speak out at internal party meetings, 
and also publicly/tends to speak out at internal party meetings, but not publicly). 
 (He/She) spends on average (1 day/2 days/3 days/4 days) of a 5-day week reviewing 
and working on national policies in Parliament, and  
 The remaining (4 days/3 days/2 days/1 day) days working on local constituency 
issues. 
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Appendix 2: Follow-up questions 
 
Below is the full text of the questions used in the main body of the text. These questions were 
asked immediately after the conjoint analysis survey experiments. 
Study 1: 
During the last 3 or 4 years, did you or someone you know well seek personal assistance from 
your local MP? 
 
Yes, I did 
Yes, someone I know well did 
No, neither I nor anyone I know did 
Don't know 
 
If you were concerned about a local issue, how likely, if at all, would you be to contact your 
MP personally regarding the issue? 
 
Very likely 
Fairly likely 
Not very likely 
Not likely at all 
Don't know 
 
 
Study 2: 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (Please tick 
one option on each row) (order randomized) 
1. I care more about how things are going in my local area than about how things are going in 
the UK as a whole. 
2. I pay more attention to national UK politics than to politics in my local area. 
3. An MP makes more of a difference on local issues than on national policy. 
4. Individual MPs have an important influence on national policy in Parliament. 
 
Strongly agree 
Tend to agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Tend to disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Don’t know 
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Appendix 3: Full conjoint analysis results 
 
In the main body of the paper, when presenting results from our two conjoint analysis 
experiments we concentrate solely on the effects of a single MP attribute: how many days per 
week the fictional MP spends doing constituency work as opposed to national policy work. 
This is because effort allocation is the substantive focus of the paper. However, as discussed 
in the main text, the fictional MPs presented to respondents in our experiments each have a 
number of attributes, whose levels vary randomly. We examine the effects of some of these 
attributes in more detail in other ongoing work. However, for completeness, Figure S1 and 
Figure S2 plot estimated average marginal component effects (AMCE) (Hainmueller et al. 
2014) for all MP attributes included in Study 1 and Study 2, respectively. In both figures, we 
include estimates for the MP time allocation attribute at the top for comparison.  
 
Study 1 
In Study 1, fictional MPs were characterised by four attributes in addition to MP time 
allocation: MP party affiliation, frequency of dissent, sex, and tenure in Parliament. We can 
draw a number of conclusions about the effects of these attributes based on Figure S1. Taking 
MP party affiliation first, we see that Labour MPs enjoy a small but statistically significant 
advantage over their Conservative counterparts. Britons were on average 2.6 [0.8, 4.4] 
percentage points more likely to prefer a Labour MP than a Conservative MP. While the 
effect of MP party here is small, note that it averages over subjects with different partisan 
preferences. One would expect the effect of MP party to be much greater in subpopulations 
that have particularly strong partisan preferences and more detailed analysis of the relevant 
subsamples, not reported here, confirms this expectation. This slight average preference for 
Labour MPs is consistent with the results of opinion polls fielded around the same time as our 
survey. Thus, vote intention polls fielded in the same week as our survey showed an estimated 
40 
 
lead for Labour over the Conservatives of at least 9 percentage points (see 
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/voting-intention-2).   
Second, turning to MP dissent, we find that British voters strongly prefer to have an 
MP who exhibits independence from his or her party. Even comparing an MP who never 
speaks out or votes against the party (the baseline) to one who does so rarely, citizens are 13.0 
[11.1, 15.0] percentage points more likely to prefer the latter. The effects of MP dissent are 
generally greater in magnitude than MP time allocation.  (See Campbell et al. 2014 for further 
discussion of these results.)  
Third, in contrast to party affiliation and independence, the sex of an MP makes very 
little difference to the probability an MP is preferred: a male MP is 0.9 percentage points less 
likely to be preferred than a female MP, but the confidence interval for this effect overlaps 
with zero.  
Fourth, we find only a weak preference for MPs with greater parliamentary 
experience: there is a very small positive effect of an MP having 10 or 21 years of experience 
compared to the baseline level of 3 years, and the effect is only significant in the case of 21 
years.  
 
Study 2 
In Study 2, fictional MPs were again characterised by four attributes in addition to MP time 
allocation, but this time these attributes were: MP party affiliation, the chief influence on the 
MP’s policy views, nature of MP dissent, and MP sex. We draw conclusions about the effects 
of these attributes based on Figure S2.  
First, regarding MP party affiliation, as in Study 1 we find that Labour MPs enjoy a 
small but statistically significant advantage over their Conservative counterparts. Voters were 
this time 3.5 [1.9, 5.3] percentage points more likely to prefer a Labour MP than a 
Conservative MP on average.  
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Second, we find that British voters strongly prefer a delegate-type MP to a trustee-
type. Specifically, MPs whose policy stances were mainly influenced by the views of their 
constituents were on average 22.8 [21.3, 24.4] points more likely to be chosen than those who 
were mainly influenced by their own views. 
Third, we find that when it comes to the nature of dissent in which an MP engages, 
British voters most prefer an MP who expresses disagreement with their party leadership at 
internal party meetings and also publicly. MPs who tend to dissent both internally and 
externally were on average 23.4 [21.6, 25.2] points more likely to be chosen by voters than 
MPs who tend not to dissent against their party leadership at all, an effect comparable in 
magnitude with that of being a delegate-type MP. MPs who only tended to dissent internally 
with their party leadership when they disagreed with a policy were also much more likely to 
be preferred by voters than MPs who tended not to dissent at all. At 13.7 [11.9, 15.4] the 
effect of internal dissent is clearly lower than that of combined internal and external dissent. 
(See Campbell et al. 2014 for further discussion of these results.) 
Finally, as with Study 1, the point estimate of the effect of an MP being male is again 
negative and relatively small. However, in this study, the 95 per cent confidence interval for 
the effect does not overlap with zero, suggesting that British voters on average tend to slightly 
prefer a female to a male MP. 
 
Benchmarking effects against co-partisanship 
One way to gauge the magnitude of the effect of each MP attribute in the conjoint analyses is 
to compare it to the effect of voter-MP co-partisanship.  To measure co-partisanship in our 
conjoint analysis data, we code whether the party affiliation of an MP is the same as 
respondent self-reported party identification or not (in cases where the respondent does not 
identify with any party we assign the observation to the latter category). Figure S3 plots the 
estimated effects of MP constituency focus in Study 1 alongside the effect of co-partisanship 
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in the same study. The effect of voter-MP co-partisanship is relatively strong, increasing the 
probability that a voter chooses the MP by 17 points. However, at between 7 and 13 points, 
the effects of each non-baseline level of MP constituency focus are by no means dwarfed by 
the effect of co-partisanship. 
 Of course, co-partisanship should dominate the conjoint analysis responses most when 
voters have to choose between MPs from differing parties. Figure S4 compares the effects of 
MP constituency focus and co-partisanship when we subset our Study 1 data to different-party 
comparisons. Here, the effect of co-partisanship is very strong, increasing the probability of 
support for an MP by almost 35 points. This is much larger than the effects of MP 
constituency work, as one would expect in a party-dominated political system. Nevertheless, 
the effects of MP constituency work are still statistically distinguishable from zero and – at 
between 5 and 10 percent in size – non-trivial in terms of magnitude.  
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Figure S1: Effects of MP attributes on probability of being preferred by voter, Study 1 
 
Note: Points show the average marginal component effect of each MP attribute level compared to the 
baseline level of the attribute. Bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals.   
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Figure S2: Effects of MP attributes on probability of being preferred by voter, Study 2 
 
Note: Points show the average marginal component effect of each MP attribute level compared to the 
baseline level of the attribute. Bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
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Figure S3: Comparing the effects of MP constituency focus and voter-MP co-
partisanship (Study 1) 
 
Note: Points show the average marginal component effect of each MP attribute level compared to the 
baseline level of the attribute. Bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
 
Figure S4: Comparing the effects of MP constituency focus and voter-MP co-
partisanship, different-party comparisons only (Study 1) 
 
Note: Points show the average marginal component effect of each MP attribute level compared to the 
baseline level of the attribute. Bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
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Appendix 4: Conjoint Analysis Diagnostics 
 
In this section we report on the conjoint analysis diagnostic tests recommended in 
Hainmueller et al (2014). 
 
Carryover effects 
In our conjoint analysis experiment, each respondent undertakes five choice tasks. Our 
AMCE estimates assume that there is no ‘carryover’ from one choice task to another. In other 
words, a respondent’s choice between two MPs with a given set of attributes is unaffected by 
the MP profiles he or she has already been exposed to in previous choice tasks. To assess the 
plausibility of this assumption, we test whether the AMCE estimates are stable across each 
choice task by interacting each MP attribute with a set of choice task indicators. For every MP 
attribute in both Study 1 and Study 2, F-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction 
between the MP attribute and the choice task at the 0.05 level of significance. Therefore, we 
are confident that our AMCE estimates are stable across choice tasks. 
 
Profile order effects 
Our AMCE estimates also assume that, for any given choice task, the effects of each MP 
attribute for the MP presented first in the choice task (i.e. for MP 1) are the same as those for 
the MP presented second in the choice task (MP 2). To test this assumption, we interact 
indicators for each MP attribute with an indicator for MP 2. For all five MP attributes in 
Study 1, F-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between the MP attribute 
and the MP 2 indicator at the 0.05 level of significance. In Study 2, for all five MP attributes 
except MP Party, F-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between MP 
attribute and MP 2 indicator at the 0.05 level of significance. For the MP Party attribute in 
Study 2, the F-test for an interaction with the MP 2 indicator is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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However, further inspection reveals that the interaction is very small in magnitude, with the 
effect of being a Labour MP reduced by 2 percentage points when the MP is listed second. 
Overall, then we conclude that there is little evidence of substantial profile order effects in our 
conjoint analysis experiments. 
 
Randomization 
By randomizing the assignment of MP attribute levels in our conjoint analysis we ensure that 
attribute levels are independent of respondent characteristics in expectation. However, we can 
still check whether there is good balance across treatment groups in terms of observable 
respondent characteristics. Since our respondent characteristics are mainly categorised, to 
assess balance we crosstabulate each MP attribute against a series of respondent demographic 
variables (social grade, age group, sex, party ID, qualifications, region). In each case, we use 
a 𝜒2 statistic to test the null hypothesis that the MP attribute levels are independent of the 
demographic variable. For Study 1, we find that all 𝜒2 tests are non-significant at the 0.05 
level. For Study 2, all 𝜒2 tests are non-significant at the 0.05 level except that for the 
association between MP party and respondent party ID. However, inspection of the 
crosstabulation for these two variables reveals only small differences in party ID distributions 
across each MP party treatment group (differences in row proportions were all under 2 
percent). Overall, we conclude that there is good balance in our experimental groups. 
 
Attribute order effects 
If we include too many MP attributes in our conjoint analysis respondents we might 
overwhelm respondents with information and risk the external validity of our findings. One 
indication of information overload might be that respondents ignore all but the first, or all but 
the last, MP attributes. One way of testing for this problem is to randomise the order in which 
MP attributes are presented to respondents and test whether this ordering interacts with MP 
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attribute effects.  
We cannot perform this diagnostic test with our data: as discussed in the main text, 
because of the paragraph/bullet point format in which we present our MP vignettes, we do not 
randomise the ordering of the MP attributes in our conjoint analyses. However, we did vary 
the placement of our key MP attribute, time allocated to constituency and national policy 
work, respectively, across our two studies. In Study 1 the MP time allocation attribute was 
reported in the first two bullet points following the introductory sentence about the MP, while 
in Study 2 it was reported in the last two bullet points. As Figure 2 in the main text shows, the 
estimates AMCEs for MP time allocation levels are remarkably stable across both Study 1 
and Study 2, with overlapping confidence intervals in each case. This is by no means 
conclusive evidence, but it does suggest a lack of attribute order effects for our key MP 
attribute of interest in this paper. 
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Appendix 5: Conjoint analysis results for same-party versus different-party 
comparisons 
 
In the main body of the paper, we note that the presence of effects for effort allocation does 
not depend on whether respondents are choosing between MPs from the same party or 
between MPs from different parties. Moreover, the shape of the effects (in terms of relative 
magnitude) also remains the same. The results are presented in the Figure below. 
 
Figure S5: Effect of MP constituency focus, same-party versus different-party 
comparisons (Study 1) 
 
Note: The top estimates are those for choice tasks where the MPs are from different parties, 
the bottom estimates for when both MPs are from the same party (Labour or Conservative). 
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Appendix 6: Further analysis of voter characteristics and preferences over MP 
constituency focus 
 
In our survey data we measure a number socio-demographic characteristics and political 
attitudes for each respondent. In the graphs below, we show that preferences over MP 
constituency time allocation (as estimated from our conjoint analysis experiment) do not 
appear to be strongly related to these characteristics or attitudes. 
 Figures S6 and S7 are referred to in the main text when we discuss our experimental 
evidence concerning the self-interested reasoning account of voter preferences over MP effort 
allocation. Both suggest that voters who are plausibly more likely to benefit from a 
constituency oriented MP do not appear to have a particularly strong preference for MPs who 
engage in more constituency work. Figure S6 compares AMCE estimates of MP days spent 
on constituency work for two groups of respondents: those who have sought personal 
assistance from an MP in the last 3-4 years, or know someone who has done so; and those for 
whom this is not the case. There are no clearly discernible differences in the estimated effects 
of MP constituency work across the two groups: the maximum difference in AMCE point 
estimates across the two groups is only 3 per cent (for the AMCE of four MP days on 
constituency work), the confidence intervals for the estimated effects tend to overlap with 
each other, and an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between MP 
constituency work and voter propensity to seek MP assistance (P = 0.44). Figure S7 breaks 
respondents into four social grade subgroups (AB, C1, C2, DE) and shows AMCE estimates 
of MP days spent on constituency work for each subgroup. Again, there are few clearly 
discernible differences in effects across subgroups, and an F-test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of no variation in effects (P = 0.58). 
 Also discussed in the main text are Figures S8 and S9, which relate to the possibility 
that if voters are self-interested and reason instrumentally, it may be the case that perceptions 
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of the relative efficacy of MP constituency work and national policy work condition the 
relationship between how much a voter stands to benefit personally from constituency service 
and how much effort a voter prefers their MP to allocate to constituency service. Specifically, 
if we compare a group of voters who stand to benefit only a little from constituency service 
and a group who stand to benefit a great deal from constituency service, it may be that the 
latter group only prefers their MP to allocate substantially more effort to constituency work 
when they also believe that MPs can have a reasonable local impact through such work. To 
examine this possibility, we grouped respondents according to perceptions of the relative 
efficacy of MP constituency work and national policy work (based on levels of agreement 
with statements 1 and 2 in the main text). Then, within each of these groups we compared the 
estimated experimental effect of MP days spent on constituency work by respondent social 
grade (ABC1 versus C2DE), assuming again that respondents with higher social grades stand 
to benefit less from constituency work than those with lower social grades.
16
  
 We find little evidence that the effects of MP days spent on constituency work vary by 
social grade regardless of whether respondents see constituency work or national policy work 
as particularly efficacious. Figure S8 shows that, for each level of agreement with the 
statement that ‘a typical MP makes more of a difference on local issues than on national 
policy’, the effects of MP time allocation tend to be similar in magnitude across both social 
grade groups and an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that such effects are independent 
of the interaction between social grade and respondent perception of MP relative impact (P = 
                                                          
16
 Since we are already subsetting our data into three groups according to levels of agreement 
with statements 1 and 2, here we group respondents into two (rather than four) social grade 
groups: ABC1 and C2DE. Our substantive results do not change when we break down 
respondents into the more fine-grained four-way social grade categorisation (AB, C1, C2 and 
DE)  
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0.33).
17
 In Figure S9 the effects of MP effort allocation tend to be similar in magnitude for 
both social grade groups the upper two panels. In the lower panel – i.e. among respondents for 
whom MP parliamentary influence is relatively high – the estimated effects of an MP 
spending 3 and 4 days per week (as opposed to the 1 day per week baseline) on constituency 
work is slightly larger in the C2DE group than the ABC2 group. However, t-tests indicates 
that these particular difference are not significant (P = 0.46 and P = 0.18).
18
 Furthermore, if 
voters were self-interested and reasoned instrumentally we would expect the difference to be 
in the opposite directions (assuming that ABC1 respondents stand to gain less from 
constituency work relative to national policy work). We find similar results when we proxy 
likely personal benefits from constituency work by household income instead of social grade. 
 The remaining figures show that preferences over MP constituency effort allocation do 
not appear to be strongly related to other background characteristics, co-partisanship with MP 
(Figure S10); voter age-group (S11); gender (S12); educational qualifications (S13); region 
(S14); urban-rural location (S15); and population density (S16). 
  
                                                          
17
 Consistent with the instrumental and self-interested reasoning account, when respondents 
agree that MPs make more of a difference on local issues than on national policy, the 
estimated effect of an MP spending 3 days per week (as opposed to the 1 day per week 
baseline) on constituency work is slightly larger in the C2DE group than the ABC2 group. 
However, a t-test indicates that this particular difference is not significant (P = 0.16), and for 
the same perception group, the estimated effect of an MP spending 4 days per week on 
constituency service varies very little by social grade. 
18
An F-test also fails to reject the joint null hypothesis that the effects of MP days spent on 
constituency work are independent of the interaction between social grade and respondent 
agreement with statement 2 (P = 0.33). 
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Figure S6: Effect of MP constituency focus conditional on whether subject (or someone 
they know well) has sought personal assistance from MP in last 3-4 years (Study 1) 
 
Note: The top estimates are for voters who have sought personal assistance from their MP in 
the last 3-4 years or else know someone who has done so (22.9% of respondents); the bottom 
estimates are for those for whom this is not the case (67.5% of respondents). Data from Study 
1. 
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Figure S7: Effect of MP constituency focus by subject social grade (Study 1) 
 
Note: Each panel depicts estimate for voters with a different social grade. The social grades 
are: AB, upper middle class or middle class (36.3% of respondents); C1, lower middle class 
(29.4%); C2, skilled working class (13.5%); DE, working class or not working (20.8%). Data 
from Study 1. 
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Figure S8: Effect of MP constituency focus by subject perceptions of MP local influence 
and subject social grade (Study 2) 
 
Note: Each panel shows estimates for British voters grouped by their level of agreement with 
the statement that ‘a typical MP makes more of a difference on local issues than on national 
policy.’ Respondents recorded their level of agreement with each statement on a five-point 
scale, and we re-coded these responses into three groups: ‘disagree’, ‘neither’, and ‘agree’ 
Within each panel, estimates are graphed separately for respondents classified in the ABC1 
and C2DE social grade groups, respectively.   
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Figure S9: Effect of MP constituency focus by subject perceptions of MP parliamentary 
influence and subject social grade (Study 2) 
 
Note: Each panel shows estimates for British voters grouped by their level of agreement with 
the statement that ‘individual MPs can have an important influence on national policy in 
Parliament.’ Respondents recorded their level of agreement with each statement on a five-
point scale, and we re-coded these responses into three groups: ‘disagree’, ‘neither’, and 
‘agree’. Within each panel, estimates are graphed separately for respondents classified in the 
ABC1 and C2DE social grade groups, respectively.  
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Figure S10: Effects of MP constituency focus by voter-MP co-partisanship 
 
Note:  Based on Study 1. The top panel reports AMCE estimates for MP constituency time allocation 
when the respondent and MP are not co-partisans (i.e. the respondent does not identify with the party 
with which the MP is affiliated). The bottom panel reports AMCE estimates for MP constituency time 
allocation when the respondent and MP are co-partisans. The effects of MP time allocation are similar 
in both panels, indicating that voters’ preferences over MP constituency focus do not depend on 
whether or not the MP is a co-partisan. Supporting this, an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
no interaction between MP constituency time allocation and voter-MP co-partisanship (P = 0.68).   
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Figure S11: Effects of MP constituency focus by voter age-group 
 
Note:  Based on Study 1. Each panel reports AMCE estimates for MP constituency time allocation 
based on respondents from a particular age group. The effects of MP time allocation are similar across 
all panels, indicating that voters’ preferences over MP constituency focus do not vary by age. 
Supporting this, an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between MP constituency 
time allocation and voter age group (P = 0.13). 
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Figure S12: Effects of MP constituency focus by voter sex 
 
Note:  Based on Study 1. The two panels report MP constituency time allocation AMCE estimates for 
male and female respondents, respectively. The effects of MP time allocation are similar across all 
panels, indicating that voters’ preferences over MP constituency focus do not vary by sex. Supporting 
this, an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between MP constituency time 
allocation and voter sex (P = 0.35). 
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Figure S13: Effects of MP constituency focus by voter educational qualification 
 
Note:  Based on Study 1. Each panel reports MP constituency time allocation AMCE estimates for 
respondents with a different level of highest educational qualification (coded according to the UK 
National Qualifications Framework). The effects of MP time allocation are of similar magnitude 
across all panels. Supporting this, an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between 
MP constituency time allocation and voter qualifications (P = 0.63). Overall, we have no evidence that 
that voters’ preferences over MP constituency focus vary by level of education.   
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Figure S14: Effects of MP constituency focus by region 
 
Note:  Based on Study 1. Each panel reports MP constituency time allocation AMCE estimates for 
respondents from a different government region in Great Britain. The effects of MP time allocation are 
of similar magnitude across all panels. Supporting this, an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
no interaction between MP constituency time allocation and respondent region (P = 0.53). Overall, we 
have no evidence that that voters’ preferences over MP constituency focus vary by region.   
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Figure S15: Effects of MP constituency focus by urban-rural location 
 
Note:  Based on Study 1. Each panel reports MP constituency time allocation AMCE estimates for 
respondents who report residing in city, town and rural locations respectively. The effects of MP time 
allocation are of similar magnitude across all panels. Supporting this, an F-test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of no interaction between MP constituency time allocation and respondent region (P = 
0.56). Overall, we have no evidence that that voters’ preferences over MP constituency focus vary by 
urban-rural location. 
Respondent rural-urban location classification is based on answers to the question: “Which of the 
following do you think best describes where you live? 1. A city; 2.  A town; 3. The suburbs of a city; 
4. The suburbs of a town; 5. A village or the countryside; 6. Don’t know.” For the graph, answers 1 
and 3 were coded as “City”; answers 2 and 4 were coded as “Town”; answer 5 was coded as “Rural”; 
and answer 6 was coded as missing. We obtain similar results if we recode this to “Urban” (1 and 2), 
“Suburban” (3 and 4) and “Rural” (5) categories. 
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Figure S16: Effects of MP constituency focus by population density 
 
Note:  Based on Study 1. Each panel reports MP constituency time allocation AMCE estimates for 
respondents whose constituency is classed as having very high, high, low, or very low population 
density. The effects of MP time allocation are of similar magnitude across all panels. Supporting this, 
an F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between MP constituency time allocation 
and respondent region (P = 0.997). Overall, we have no evidence that that voters’ preferences over MP 
constituency focus vary by population density of constituency. 
Respondent constituency location is provided by YouGov. Constituency population density is 
calculated by combining information on constituency area from Ordinance Survey shapefiles with 
information on size of electorate from Norris (2010). The four categories of population density used in 
the plot are defined based on the quartiles of the distribution of population density in the survey 
sample. 
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Appendix 7: Robustness of local-cosmopolitanism interactions to controls 
In the main body of the paper, we note that the interaction between voter local-
cosmopolitanism and MP days spent on constituency service is robust to the inclusion of 
controls for respondent background characteristics which may be thought to predict local-
cosmopolitanism. The results on which this claim rest are reported in Table S.1, below.  
 This table shows a series of OLS regression models for our binary measure of whether 
or not a hypothetical MP is chosen by a respondent. In Models 1 and 3 we replicate the results 
graphed in Figure 4 of the main text, estimating simple specifications where the only 
predictors are a set of indicators for the number of MP days spent on constituency service, 
indicators for levels of respondent local-cosmopolitanism, and the interaction between these 
two sets of indicators. In Model 1 we measure local-cosmopolitanism via respondent level of 
agreement with the statement “I care more about how things are in my local area than about 
how things are in the UK as a whole” (local identification). In Model 3 we use respondent 
agreement with the statement “I pay more attention to national UK politics than to politics in 
my local area” (national attention). Both measures are scored as “low” if the respondent 
strongly disagrees or tends to disagree with the statement, “medium” if the respondent neither 
agrees nor disagrees with the statement, and is “high” if the respondent tends to agree or 
strongly agrees with the statement.  
 In Models 2 and 4, we also control for a series of respondent background 
characteristics (some of which are significant predictors of local-cosmopolitan orientation) 
and their interaction with MP days spent on constituency service: annual household income 
(£19,999 or below, £20,000 to 39,999, or £40,000 and above); age (18-24, 25-39, 40-59, 60 
and above); gender;  social grade (AB, C1, C2, DE); education qualification (Level 1/2, Level 
3, Level 4, None/Other/Unknown); and region. When we add these controls, the estimated 
coefficients on the interactions between MP days spent on constituency work and respondent 
local-cosmopolitanism remain relatively stable in terms of magnitude and significance. 
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Table S.1: Robustness of local cosmopolitanism interactions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.474
***
 (0.011) 0.320
***
 (0.088) 0.399
***
 (0.017) 0.237
***
 (0.091) 
Two days 0.062
***
 (0.017) 0.341
**
 (0.146) 0.099
***
 (0.025) 0.364
**
 (0.143) 
Three days 0.068
***
 (0.018) 0.291
**
 (0.149) 0.159
***
 (0.028) 0.413
***
 (0.155) 
Four days -0.026 (0.019) 0.097 (0.156) 0.140
***
 (0.029) 0.277
*
 (0.160) 
Medium local ID -0.045
***
 (0.016) -0.032
*
 (0.019) 
  
High local ID -0.079
***
 (0.017) -0.085
***
 (0.021) 
  
Two days X Medium local ID 0.011 (0.024) -0.014 (0.030) 
  
Three days X Medium local ID 0.060
**
 (0.025) 0.049 (0.030) 
  
Four days X Medium local ID 0.111
***
 (0.026) 0.095
***
 (0.032) 
  
Two days X High local ID 0.032 (0.027) 0.053 (0.032) 
  
Three days X High local ID 0.080
***
 (0.028) 0.090
***
 (0.034) 
  
Four days X High local ID 0.201
***
 (0.028) 0.193
***
 (0.035) 
  
Medium nat. attn. 
  
0.029 (0.021) 0.048
*
 (0.027) 
High nat. attn. 
  
0.054
***
 (0.020) 0.063
**
 (0.027) 
Two days X Medium nat. attn. 
  
-0.025 (0.031) -0.053 (0.040) 
Three days X Medium nat. attn. 
  
-0.030 (0.034) -0.044 (0.043) 
Four days X Medium nat. attn. 
  
-0.054 (0.035) -0.079
*
 (0.045) 
Two days X High nat. attn. 
  
-0.030 (0.029) -0.054 (0.038) 
Three days X High nat. attn. 
  
-0.075
**
 (0.031) -0.072
*
 (0.041) 
Four days X High nat. attn. 
  
-0.106
***
 (0.033) -0.104
**
 (0.044) 
Controls (incl. interactions)? No Yes No Yes 
Observations 18,610 12,800 18,540 12,770 
R
2
 0.010 0.016 0.007 0.013 
Note: 
*
p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01 
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Appendix 8: AMCE estimates for weighted and un-weighted survey samples 
 
In the main body of the paper, we note that our AMCE estimates are substantively unchanged when 
we use survey weights. The Figures below show, for Studies 1 and 2, the AMCE estimates for MP 
days spent on constituency service when survey data are not weighted (as in the main text) and 
when the survey data are weighted according to YouGov’s standard survey weights. In both figures, 
the relative magnitude of the effects are virtually the same for weighted and not weighted samples. 
 
Figure S17: AMCE estimates of MP constituency focus, weighted versus un-weighted survey 
data (Study 1) 
 
Note: The top panel shows AMCE estimates based on the un-weighted survey sample. The bottom 
panel shows AMCE estimates based on the weighted survey sample. 
Figure S18: AMCE estimates of MP constituency focus, weighted versus un-weighted survey 
data (Study 2) 
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Note: The top panel shows AMCE estimates based on the un-weighted survey sample. The bottom 
panel shows AMCE estimates based on the weighted survey sample. 
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